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ABSTRACT 
Every American generation has fought battles with foreign adversaries in 
the name of securing freedom for future generations. On September 11, 
2001, Generation Y was in elementary school when they saw the news of the 
largest terrorist attack on U.S. soil. Yet, the ideology that spawned these 
attacks continues to pose a threat to national security. This Note focuses on 
the tension between establishing an effective detainment strategy and 
complying with Supreme Court precedent. While the precedent clearly 
proscribes certain strategies, it provides no guidance on the proper 
detainment procedures. In response, this Note suggests that there should be 
less judicial interference into the military’s detainment strategies regarding 
the practice of classifying individuals as enemy combatants; the process 
where those individuals are detained; the detainee’s recourse to Article III 
courts; and the role of the Constitution and statutory regulations in vital 
military operations. 
Inherent in these components of detainment are three issues currently 
plaguing the executive, legislative, and judicial branches: (1) the standard 
for determining whether an enemy combatant is part of enemy forces; (2) 
the legal process that best addresses the tension between liberty and 
security; and (3) the length of detainment. This Note will discuss whether 
the Authorization for the Use of Military Force (“AUMF”) authorizes, and 
whether the Constitution permits, the detention of an individual on the 
basis of membership in a radical terrorist organization—such as the 
Taliban—not currently engaged in an armed conflict against the United 
States. It will also address whether the AUMF or the Constitution limits the 
duration of the detention when such an individual is detained, since the 
Court did not have an opportunity to answer the detention question in 
Hussain v. Obama, and thus left the military without any guidance on the 
Constitutional or statutory standards for resolving the durational question. 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
In the United States, the tension between security and liberty is ongoing 
and becoming more strained as threats to national security increase. This 
tension is shared among the executive, the legislature, and the judicial 
branches, all of which are attempting to maintain national security while 
determining the treatment of individuals who have committed crimes 
against the United States. All the while, these enemies do not fit within the 
traditional definitions of what constitutes a state actor, a non-state, or an 
international armed conflict. They do not fit within these traditional 
definitions because of the increasing unification of their operations separate 
from any state actor. 
To reduce judicial second guessing, this Note proposes that (1) detainees 
should be detained based solely on a military tribunal’s finding that they are 
unlawful enemy combatants; (2) trials for war crimes by a military 
commission, with certain procedural safeguards, are adequate to meet due 
process; and (3) the length of detainment should rest on evidence of 
continued dangerousness or likelihood of recidivism.  
II.  BACKGROUND 
A. The Authorization for Use of Military Force (“AUMF”) 
Congress passed the AUMF in the wake of the attacks on September 11, 
2001. The resolution’s purpose is to “authorize the use” of the military 
against “those responsible for the recent attacks launched against the 
United States.”1 The AUMF grants the President of the United States the 
“authority under the Constitution to take actions to deter and prevent acts 
of international terrorism against the United States.”2 Section 2(a) provides 
the justification for actions taken overseas and at home in the name of 
preventing terrorism against the United States. It states: 
[T]he President is authorized to use all necessary and 
appropriate force against those nations, organizations, or persons 
he determines planned, authorized, committed, or aided the 
terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001, or 
harbored such organizations or persons, in order to prevent any 
                                                                                                                                      
 1. Authorization for Use of Military Force, Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224 (2001).  
 2. Id.  
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future acts of international terrorism against the United States by 
such nations, organizations or persons.3 
Section 2(b) states that all of the powers vested therein are consistent with 
the War Powers Resolution.4  
B. The War Powers Resolution 
The purpose of the War Powers Resolution is to “fulfill the intent of the 
framers of the Constitution” by limiting the President’s power in sending 
the United States Armed Forces into hostilities.5 It invokes the “Necessary 
and Proper” Clause found in Article I, Section 8, of the U.S. Constitution in 
determining that the President’s Commander in Chief responsibilities could 
only be exercised pursuant to “(1) a declaration of war, (2) specific statutory 
authorization, or (3) a national emergency created by attack upon the 
United States, its territories or possessions, or its armed forces.”6  
By passing the AUMF, Congress, in effect, released the President from 
the restraints imposed by the War Powers Resolution. The War Powers 
Resolution was an attempt to limit the Executive’s Commander in Chief 
powers; the AUMF is an attempt to expand them. The President already 
had the power to authorize the use of military force against those 
responsible for the attacks on 9/11 under the War Powers Resolution, 
because 9/11 was a “national emergency created by attack upon the United 
States.”7 While the AUMF stipulates that it does not supersede the War 
Powers Resolution, the AUMF serves as the justification for the continued 
detention of combatants in Afghanistan and Iraq.8 Consequently, 
throughout these hostilities, there have been persons captured and deemed 
lawful or unlawful enemy combatants. Due process dictates that those who 
are detained must have an opportunity to contest the status of their 
detainment.9 However, determining the classification of detainees and their 
accompanying right to contest their classification is extremely controversial. 
Such controversy led the Supreme Court to decide Rasul v. Bush and Hamdi 
                                                                                                                                      
 3. Id.  
 4. Id.   
 5. War Powers Resolution, 50 U.S.C.A. § 1541 (West 1973).   
 6. Id.   
 7. Id.  
 8. Al-Bihani v. Obama, 590 F.3d 866, 873 (D.C. Cir. 2010).  
 9. Hamdi v. Rumsfield, 542 U.S. 507, 509 (2004).  
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v. Rumsfield in 2004, which then led to the establishment of the Combatant 
Status Review Tribunals (“CSRT”).10  
C. Combatant Status Review Tribunals  
The Combatant Status Review Tribunal (“CSRT”) is an administrative 
process used to determine whether each detainee under the control of the 
Department of Defense at Guantanamo Bay meets the criteria of an enemy 
combatant.11 Punishment is not the purpose of the CSRT.12 Instead, the 
purpose is to prevent enemy combatants from returning to the battlefield 
and engaging in further attacks against both civilians and U.S. Forces.13  
The CSRT operates under the supervision of three “neutral 
commissioned officers” who determine, under a preponderance of the 
evidence standard, whether the “evidence supports an enemy combatant 
determination.”14 In the CSRT, each individual has the right to 
representation, the right to receive a summary of evidence against him, the 
right to have exculpatory evidence provided to the tribunal, and the right to 
have any new information relating to the individual’s status heard in a 
newly convened tribunal.15 
Consistent with Article 5 of the Geneva Convention, those detained 
under unlawful enemy combatant status are not entitled to the benefit of 
Prisoner of War (“POW”) status.16 However, after Hamdi v. Rumsfield, the 
United States Supreme Court provided a path for unlawful enemy 
combatants to contest their status and the “basis for their detention.”17 The 
Court further held that a detainee has a right of habeas corpus,18 even after 
review of the combatant’s status by a military tribunal. 
                                                                                                                                      
 10. Combatant Status Review Tribunals: Purpose, DEP’T OF DEF., 
http://archive.defense.gov/news/Oct2006/ d20061017CSRT.pdf. (last visited October 14, 
2016) [hereinafter DEP’T OF DEF.]. 
 11. Id.  
 12. Id.  
 13. Id.  
 14. Id.  
 15. Id.  
 16. DEP’T OF DEF., supra note 10.  
 17. Id. 
 18. Habeas corpus is a “writ employed to bring a person before a court, most frequently 
to ensure that the person’s imprisonment or detention is not illegal.” Writ of habeas corpus 
mandates that a detainee must be produced before the issuing court to determine whether 
his detention is lawful. Habeas Corpus, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, (10th ed. 2014).   
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D. Hamdi v. Rumsfield: Procedural Protections for Citizen-Detainees 
Hamdi is the principal case that extended habeas corpus procedural 
protections to every citizen-detainee within the United States, including 
unlawful enemy combatants.19 Petitioner Hamdi was seized for allegedly 
taking up arms with the Taliban.20 The U.S. government claimed that 
Hamdi’s status as an enemy combatant justified holding him indefinitely, 
without formal charges or proceedings.21 The government also argued that 
since it was “‘undisputed’ that Hamdi’s seizure took place in a combat zone, 
the habeas determination can be made purely as a matter of law, with no 
further hearing or fact finding necessary.”22 The Hamdi Court reaffirmed 
that detentions cannot last longer than active hostilities. The Hamdi 
decision was consistent with the provisions of the Geneva Conventions,23 
which state that “[p]risoners of war shall be released and repatriated 
without delay after the cessation of active hostilities.”24 In Hamdi, the Court 
also determined that, counter to Hamdi’s argument, the government can 
detain individuals for the entire duration of hostilities as part of the lawful 
exercise of “necessary and appropriate force.”25 However, it must be 
sufficiently clear that the individual is an enemy combatant in order to do 
so.26 
The U.S. government also made a separation of powers argument, which 
has been a significant source of tension and ongoing debate.27 The 
government argued that “[r]espect for separation of powers and the limited 
institutional capabilities of courts in matters of military decision-making in 
connection with an ongoing conflict” requires very limited, individual, 
independent inquiry into the executive branch’s detention scheme.28 This 
argument was struck down by the Court, which reasoned that “the threats 
to military operations posed by a basic system of independent review are 
not so weighty as to trump a citizen’s core rights to challenge meaningfully 
                                                                                                                                      
 19. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 525 (2004).  
 20. Id. at 510. 
 21. Id.  
 22. Id. at 526. 
 23. Id. at 520.  
 24. Geneva Convention (III) Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War art. 118, 
Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, T.I.A.S. No. 3364 (Feb. 2, 1956).  
 25. Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 521. 
 26. Id. at 523.  
 27. Id. at 527.  
 28. Id. 
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the Government’s case and to be heard by an impartial adjudicator.”29 The 
Court weighed the competing interests of liberty and security, and 
ultimately concluded that the threat to liberty outweighed the risks to 
security.30 Weighing liberty against security is the heart of the ongoing 
debate. The CSRTs were created to comply with Hamdi’s requirements.31 
However, the “due process versus security” debate did not end here, but 
appeared again in Boumediene v. Bush.  
E. Boumediene v. Bush: Noncitizen Enemy Combatants  
In Boumediene, the government contended that noncitizen enemy 
combatants detained in territories located outside our Nation’s borders 
have “no constitutional rights and no privilege of habeas corpus.”32 The 
reach of the Suspension Clause became a key issue in determining whether 
noncitizen or foreign national enemy combatants are entitled to 
constitutional protections. The Suspension Clause provides that “[t]he 
Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus shall not be suspended, unless when 
in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the public Safety may require it.”33 The 
Court established three factors in determining the Suspension Clause’s 
reach: “(1) the citizenship and status of the detainee and the adequacy of the 
process through which that status determination was made; (2) the nature 
of the sites where apprehension and then detention took place; and (3) the 
practical obstacles inherent in resolving the prisoner’s entitlement to the 
writ.”34  
The Boumediene Court also entertained a separation of powers argument 
and acknowledged the risk that applying the Suspension Clause to military 
detentions abroad may divert the military’s attention from vital tasks.35 
Nonetheless, the Supreme Court, once again, valued liberty over security 
and extended habeas corpus protections to noncitizen detainees held 
abroad, despite the separation of powers concern.36  
                                                                                                                                      
 29. Id. at 535.  
 30. Id. at 532. (“It is during our most challenging and uncertain moments that our 
Nation’s commitment to due process is most severely tested; and it is in those times that we 
must preserve our commitment at home to the principles for which we fight abroad.”). 
 31. DEP’T OF DEF., supra note 10. 
 32. Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 739 (2008). 
 33. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2. 
 34. Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 766.  
 35. Id. at 769.  
 36. Id. at 771. 
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F. Hussain v. Obama: Walks like a Duck, Talks like a Duck, Must be a 
Duck 
Since 2008, when Boumediene was decided, questions of constitutional 
detainment and classification of enemy combatants have become more 
complicated. The complications stem from the supposed end of armed 
conflict against the United States in Afghanistan and the withdrawal of U.S. 
military members from Afghanistan.37 Detainees with ties to the Taliban or 
al Qaeda are still currently held in the custody of the United States Armed 
Forces. These complications concerning Taliban and al Qaeda detainees 
were addressed by the court in Hussain v. Obama. 
The D.C. Circuit adopted the common sense “walks like a duck” test in 
Hussain v. Obama to determine that the facts and circumstances (such as 
where that detainee has lived) of each case dictates whether a detainee is 
“part of” an enemy group. As the common saying goes, if the thing looks 
like a duck, walks like a duck, and quacks like a duck, then it is a duck.38 In 
this case, Appellant Abdul al Qadar Ahmed Hussain moved from Yemen to 
Pakistan, and eventually departed for Afghanistan where he resided with 
three Taliban guards.39 While there, Hussain was provided with an AK-47 
rifle and trained in its use.40 After 9/11, Hussain fled Afghanistan and 
returned to Pakistan where he lived at a Jama’at al-Tablighi mosque.41 He 
was captured in 2002 and transferred to Guantanamo Bay.42  
Hussain argued that in order to justify his status as an enemy combatant, 
the government must show that Hussain “personally picked up arms and 
engaged in active hostilities against the United States.”43 The D.C. Circuit 
admitted that there are no “categorical rules to determine whether a 
detainee is ‘part of’ an enemy group.’”44 Because there are no categorical 
rules, the court engaged in a fact-specific inquiry to determine whether 
Hussain’s ten-month stay with the Taliban and his carrying of an AK-47 
pointed to his membership of the Taliban.45 The court concluded that the 
                                                                                                                                      
 37. President Barack Obama, Statement by the President on the End of the Combat 
Mission in Afghanistan (Dec. 28, 2014).   
 38. Hussain v. Obama, 718 F.3d 964, 968 (D.C. Cir. 2013).  
 39. Id. at 966. 
 40. Id. 
 41. Id. at 969. 
 42. Id. at 966. 
 43. Id. at 967.   
 44. Hussain, 718 F.3d at 968.   
 45. Id. 
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evidence did point to his membership.46 Hussain’s final argument was that 
the district court did not determine whether he was “affiliated with al 
Qaeda, the Taliban, or both.”47 The court swiftly struck down this argument 
by stating, “[b]oth are enemy forces, and affiliation with either justifies 
detention.”48  
In this case, Hussain was captured near the front lines of the battle, lived 
with Taliban warriors for ten months, and learned how to use and carry an 
AK-47.49 He demonstrated all the signs and characteristics of being an 
unlawful enemy combatant, and, thus, must have been an unlawful enemy 
combatant who was affiliated with the Taliban.50 However, in Justice 
Edward’s concurring opinion, he eviscerated the majority’s “walks like a 
duck test” and concluded that the President and Congress must begin 
strongly considering a different approach to determining Guantanamo Bay 
detainee cases.51  
Subsequently, Hussain appealed the D.C. Circuit’s decision to the 
Supreme Court.52 Hussain’s petition for writ of certiorari to the Supreme 
Court did not specifically ask the Court to address whether Hussain was 
engaged in active hostilities.53 By denying certiorari, the Supreme Court 
declined to determine whether the D.C. Circuit was correct in its decision 
that the evidence supported a finding that Hussain was “part of” either the 
Taliban or al Qaeda.54 Although certiorari was ultimately denied, Justice 
Breyer stated,  
The Court has not directly addressed whether the AUMF 
authorizes, and the Constitution permits, detention on the basis 
that an individual was part of al Qaeda, or part of the Taliban, 
but was not ‘engaged in an armed conflict against the United 
States’ in Afghanistan prior to his capture. Nor have we 
considered whether, assuming detention on these bases is 
                                                                                                                                      
 46. Id. at 970. 
 47. Id. 
 48. Id.  
 49. Hussain, 718 F.3d at 969.   
 50. Id. at 971.  
 51. Id. at 972-73.  
 52. Hussain v. Obama, 132 S. Ct. 1621 (2014). 
 53. Id. at 1622. 
 54. Id.  
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permissible, either the AUMF or the Constitution limits the 
duration of detention.55  
This Note addresses Breyer’s unanswered question. The Supreme Court has 
not yet decided whether the government must prove that unlawful enemy 
combatants were engaged in armed conflict in order to detain them, or 
simply that they were a member in an associated force. These questions 
cannot remain unanswered as “[a] solid U.S. law-of-war detainee program 
is a key component of the U.S. national defense and strategy now and in the 
future.”56 
III.  PERSONS SUBJECT TO DETENTION 
A. In Ex parte Quirin: Offenders Against the Law of War 
During World War II, German saboteurs landed near Jacksonville, 
Florida, buried their uniforms, and disguised themselves in civilian 
clothes.57 After landing, they were arrested by the FBI, tried before a 
military tribunal, and subsequently executed.58 The Supreme Court upheld 
the process whereby the saboteurs were executed.59 The Court recognized 
the traditional distinction between lawful and unlawful combatants by 
stating: 
By universal agreement and practice the law of war draws a 
distinction between the armed forces and the peaceful 
populations of belligerent nations and also between those who 
are lawful and unlawful combatants. Lawful combatants are 
subject to capture and detention as prisoners of war by opposing 
military forces. Unlawful combatants are likewise subject to 
capture and detention, but in addition they are subject to trial 
and punishment by military tribunals for acts which render their 
belligerency unlawful. The spy who secretly and without uniform 
passes the military lines of a belligerent in time of war, seeking to 
gather military information and communicate it to the enemy, or 
an enemy combatant who without uniform comes secretly 
                                                                                                                                      
 55. Id.  
 56. Sandra L. Hodgkinson, Detention Operations: A Strategic Overview, U.S. MILITARY 
OPERATIONS 275, 305 (Geoffrey S. Corn et al. eds., 2016).  
 57. Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 21 (1942). 
 58. CALVIN MASSEY, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: POWERS AND LIBERTIES 400 (5th 
ed. 2016). 
 59. Quirin, 317 U.S. at 48. 
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through the lines for the purpose of waging war by destruction of 
life or property, are familiar examples of belligerents who are 
generally deemed not to be entitled to the status of prisoners of 
war, but to be offenders against the law of war subject to trial and 
punishment by military tribunals.60  
Because the Germans did not identify themselves, but instead secretly 
operated with the intention of destructing life and property, they were not 
entitled to the protections of POW status. Accordingly, military tribunals 
were sufficient to determine their status and the consequences of their 
secretive, untraditional actions. In the years since World War II, America’s 
enemies have changed, but their untraditional form of warfare has not.  
B. Classification, Classification, Classification 
Modern conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan have seen “the emergence of a 
third category of detainees: unprivileged enemy belligerents.”61 Combatant 
status originated from the 1907 Hague Convention, which resulted in the 
Regulations Respecting the Law and Customs of War on Land.62 These 
regulations applied the laws, rights, and duties of war not only to armies, 
but also to militia and volunteer corps meeting the following criteria: “[t]o 
be commanded by a person responsible for his subordinates; [t]o have a 
fixed distinctive emblem recognizable at a distance; [t]o carry arms openly; 
and [t]o conduct their operations in accordance with the laws and customs 
of war.”63 After World War II, the Third Geneva Convention clearly 
delineated that POWs are captured combatants who fulfill the above-
mentioned criteria.64 POWs “enjoy the protection of the present 
Convention until such time as their status has been determined by a 
competent tribunal.”65  
Many of America’s modern enemies do not fit the traditional mold of a 
lawful enemy combatant. Unlawful enemy combatants do not fit into the 
                                                                                                                                      
 60. Id. at 30–31. 
 61. Jeffrey Bovarnick & Jack Vrett, Detention Operations at the Tactical and Operational 
Levels, U.S. MILITARY OPERATIONS 307, 337 (Geoffrey S. Corn et al. eds., 2016).  
 62. LAURIE R. BLANK & GREGORY P. NOONE, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND ARMED CONFLICT: 
FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES AND CONTEMPORARY CHALLENGES IN THE LAW OF WAR 98 (2016).  
 63. Id.  
 64. Id. at 102 (citing Geneva Convention (III) Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of 
War, supra note 24). 
 65. Id.   
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Geneva Convention’s Article 4 description of POWs.66 An unlawful enemy 
combatant is not part of an identifiable command structure, has no 
distinguishing insignia, does not carry arms openly, and does not conduct 
operations in accordance with the law and customs of war.67 Unlawful 
enemy combatants are also referred to as “persons who fight without the 
right to engage in hostilities; that is, persons who are not part of any regular 
army or militia and would never qualify as combatants or prisoners of 
war.”68  
However, the military conflict between al Qaeda, ISIS, and associated 
forces blurs the line between an unlawful enemy combatant and a POW.69 
Al Qaeda, in particular, operates using a hierarchical structure and 
performs military-style operations with a “clear rank structure.”70 Also, 
terrorist organizations do not report to a state and, therefore, are non-state 
actors,71 unlike the enemies that the U.S. faced in World War II. Although 
most terrorist organizations arguably have an identifiable command 
structure, their members do not “wear uniforms, carry . . . arms openly or 
mass [their] troops at the borders of the nations [they] attack . . . .”72 They 
also do not carry on their “operations” in accordance with the laws of war, 
as demonstrated through attacks such as the World Trade bombing in 1992, 
the 1998 East African bombings in Kenya and Tanzania, and the 9/11 
attacks.73 Because America’s modern enemies demonstrate factors from 
both unlawful enemy combatant status and POW status, the traditional 
definition of both classifications has been strained. However, determining 
the status of a person is of utmost importance in determining whether the 
protections of the Geneva Convention attach to the individual.  
C. Hamdan v. Rumsfield: Character of the Conflict? International v. Non-
International 
In Hamdan, the Supreme Court determined the conflicts with al Qaeda 
and the Taliban were not international armed conflicts.74 The Court decided 
                                                                                                                                      
 66. Geneva Convention (III) Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, supra note 
24, at art. 4.  
 67. Blank & Noone, supra note 62, at 93-94. 
 68. Id. at 104.  
 69. Id.  
 70. Hodgkinson, supra note 56, at 276.  
 71. Id. at 277. 
 72. Blank & Noone, supra note 62, at 94.  
 73. Hodgkinson, supra note 56, at 277.  
 74. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 630-32 (2006). 
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that these conflicts were non-international armed conflicts because these 
organizations were non-state actors.75 A non-international conflict, as 
understood in Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions, includes an 
armed conflict that involves one or more non-governmental armed 
groups.76 On the other hand, an international armed conflict involves one 
or more States involved in armed force against another State.77 Thus, 
international armed conflicts are those that oppose a High Contracting 
Party, meaning a State.78 Because an international armed conflict does not 
require a formal declaration of war,79 determining whether an international 
armed conflict exists depends on a fact specific inquiry into what occurs on 
the ground.80 Once an international armed conflict is established, 
international humanitarian law applies and the protections of the Geneva 
Convention attach to those captured.81 Contrarily, Article 3 protections 
require that those captured in non-international armed conflict appear 
before a “regularly constituted court affording all the judicial guarantees 
which are recognized as indispensable by civilized peoples.”82  
In determining whether the conflicts with al Qaeda and the Taliban were 
of an international or non-international character, the Court adopted a type 
of original intent line of reasoning.83 The Court stated that the Convention 
did consider “limiting language that would have rendered Common Article 
3 applicable ‘especially [to] cases of civil war, colonial conflicts, or wars of 
religion,’ [which] was omitted from the final version of the Article, which 
coupled broader scope of application with a narrower range of rights than 
did earlier proposed iterations.”84 Without addressing whether the facts of 
Hamdan fit within the proposed definition, the Court concluded that the 
conflicts with the Taliban and al Qaeda were non-international conflicts.85  
                                                                                                                                      
 75. Id.  
 76. INT’L COMM’N. OF THE RED CROSS (ICRC), HOW IS THE TERM “ARMED CONFLICT” 
DEFINED IN INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW? 1 (2008), 
https://www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/other/opinion-paper-armed-conflict.pdf. 
 77. Id.  
 78. Id.  
 79. Id.  
 80. Id.  
 81. Id.  
 82. Geneva Convention (III) Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, supra note 
24.  
 83. See Hamdan v. Rumsfield, 548 U.S. 557 (2006).  
 84. Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 631.  
 85. Id. at 630-31.  
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The distinction the Hamdan Court provided between non-international 
and international armed conflict was taken from the Commentary on the 
Additional Protocols to the Geneva Conventions of August 12, 1989, which 
provides that the difference between a non-international and international 
armed conflict is the legal status of the opposing entities.86 Al Qaeda and the 
Taliban do not report to a state and, therefore, they do not have the legal 
status of a nation state.87 The classification of a “non-state actor” would be 
the differentiating “legal status” that classifies conflicts with terrorist 
organizations as non-international armed conflicts. This classification 
comports with the Court’s interpretation of a non-international conflict as 
one that “does not involve a clash between nations.”88  
D. From Capture to Detainment  
At the point of capture, regardless of the prisoners’ classification, all 
personnel have six steps to ensure legal and safety protocols are satisfied: 
“(1) Search, (2) Silence, (3) Safeguard, (4) Segregate, (5) Speed to the Rear, 
and (6) Tag.”89 This strict process “transforms legal obligations related to 
the protection and respect of all detainees into a battle drill for the 
personnel most likely to capture them.”90 After an Article 5 tribunal 
determines whether the captured is a POW or an unlawful enemy 
combatant, the captured person is transferred to a Theater Internment 
Facility (“TIF”) where other persons of the same classification are kept.91 
The largest TIF in Iraq, Camp Bucca, once housed twenty-five thousand 
detainees.92 However, that number was drawn down near the end of the war 
as the detainees were either released or turned over to the Iraqi government 
for prosecution or another form of disposition.93 There is also a similar plan 
in Afghanistan to draw down the detention facility in Parwan and hand the 
detainees over to the Afghan government for prosecution of crimes.94 
However, an immense problem remains because Afghanistan has not 
developed an effective criminal justice system with the ability to handle the 
large amount of detainees that would be suddenly thrust upon it. 
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Nevertheless, Afghanistan and similar countries have just cause to 
prosecute those who have committed atrocities against their own people, 
just as our armed forces have just cause to prosecute atrocities committed 
against the U.S.  
E. Defining “Part Of” Enemy Forces—Mattan v Obama 
In Mattan v. Obama, the appellants, Mattan, along with seven other 
detainees, brought a habeas proceeding to challenge the legality of their 
detention.95 The issue before the court was whether the petitioners’ 
detainment was within the scope of the government’s authority and 
consistent with domestic law and laws of war.96 The United States 
government claimed that it had the authority under the AUMF to detain 
persons who were “part of, or substantially supported, Taliban or al-Qaida 
forces or associated forces that are engaged in hostilities against the United 
States or its coalition partners.”97 The D.C. district court struck down two 
definitions proposed by the federal government as falling “outside the 
bounds” of the AUMF.98 First, the government did not have the “authority 
to detain those who ‘substantially supported’ enemy forces.”99 Second, those 
who have “directly supported hostilities” by aiding enemy forces are not 
considered “part of” those enemy forces and do not fall under the 
authorization of the AUMF.100 Nevertheless, the D.C. court upheld the one 
aspect of the government’s definition, which included a provision that those 
who are “part of” such forces are properly subject to detainment.101 
Furthermore, “support of” enemy forces can still be used as a factor in 
determining whether a detainee is “part of” enemy forces, but it is not 
sufficient as a stand-alone test for determining lawful detainment.102 “Part 
of” means those who are members of enemy forces “at the time of their 
capture.”103  
The Mattan court denied that it was drafting its own definitions, 
reasoning instead that the court must determine whether the proposed 
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definition fits the within the President’s authority under the AUMF.104 
Although the D.C. court accepted the government’s provision that those 
who are “part of” enemy forces fall under the AUMF, the court seemingly 
did create its own definition of “part of” by excluding those who 
substantially or directly support enemy forces.  
Although Judge Lamberth’s clarification in his majority opinion in 
Mattan is important in understanding who can be lawfully detained, it is 
not within the judiciary’s “province” to “draft definitions.”105 As the drafter 
of the AUMF, only Congress has the proper authority to draft or amend the 
definitions to clarify its statutory intent. Most of our traditional definitions 
were designed for a traditional enemy; such definitions do not account for 
the fact that our modern-day conflicts blur the distinction between the law 
of war and traditional law enforcement.106 
The purpose of law of war detentions is to remove enemies from the 
battlefield and to prevent them from returning.107 Members in 
organizations such as al Qaeda and the Taliban can be captured and 
prevented from returning to the battlefield, but they also can be tried under 
the criminal law for crimes they have committed.108 However, the Mattan 
court did not extend the definition of “part of” to include “substantial” 
support because of its possible implication of domestic criminal law.109 The 
problem is that modern law of war overlaps with criminal law, and a refusal 
to recognize this dilemma destabilizes a solid detainee strategy.110 The 
judiciary is not tasked with drafting definitions; the legislature has the 
authority to redraft provisions that will adequately adjust traditional 
definitions to include the overlap of law of war and criminal law detentions. 
Establishing a captured person’s classification will determine the legal 
process that attaches to that classification and how to proceed with the 
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prosecution of that individual, thus contributing to less Article III 
intervention into detainment procedures. The solution is for the Court to 
defer to the Executive in exercising war-making power and to Congress in 
exercising its law-making power.  
IV.  WHAT LEGAL PROCESS ATTACHES TO THOSE DETAINED? 
A. What About Harm to Defendant’s Liberty? 
“Internment without trial is so antithetical to the rule of law as 
understood in a democratic society that recourse to it requires to be 
carefully scrutinized by the courts of that society.”111 In a sense, this is an 
argument of the lesser of the two evils: either we secure liberty at the 
possible risk of security, or we maintain security at the cost of fundamental 
liberties. Due process dictates that individuals must be protected from 
arbitrary deprivations of liberty through certain procedural safeguards.112 It 
requires that “a person in jeopardy of serious loss (be given) notice of the 
case against him and opportunity to meet it.”113 
Ultimately, the enemy combatants argue that nonintervention will 
impede their liberty.114 The alternative is to allow intervention based on 
“irreparable psychological harm” or the risk that the litigant’s defense will 
be divulged before trial in a federal court.115 The sum of the argument is that 
the litigant will suffer “great and immediate” injury and the federal court 
must not abstain.116 Irreparable harm is the first requirement for a litigant to 
fit within the exception of no abstention.117 The second requirement is that 
the defendant must also show that the alternative tribunal is “incapable of 
fairly and fully adjudicating the federal issues before it.”118 In the case of In 
re Al-Nashiri, the court concluded that the possibility of a psychological 
injury did not jeopardize his opportunity of a fair hearing in the military 
commission and, thus, intervention was not warranted.119  
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Essentially, the basis of a detainment strategy should be kept at the lowest 
level possible. First, the sensitive nature of these cases requires that certain 
considerations relevant to national security allow them to be treated 
differently. The detainment strategy requires the protection of individual 
and public safety by handling sensitive intelligence. Second, the military is 
better equipped to handle detention decisions due to the necessity of using 
evidence that is obtained in the course of standard military operations. The 
military commissions currently established are the result of extensive 
Congressional debate. Thus, deference to Congress implicitly suggests that 
the military system established for determining status is adequate to provide 
Constitutional protections. Therefore, decisions on whom to detain and 
whom to release should not be removed to Article III courts, but left in the 
“theater of war” and “normalize[d] . . . into routine military operations.”120 
B. Noncitizen Detainee 
The federal habeas corpus statute allows prisoners within the jurisdiction 
of federal courts to challenge the validity of their imprisonment.121 In Rasul 
v. Bush, the petitioner challenged his imprisonment in Guantanamo Bay 
under the federal habeas statute.122 In that case, the issue was “whether the 
habeas statute confers a right to judicial review of the legality of executive 
detention of aliens in a territory over which the United States exercises 
plenary and exclusive jurisdiction, but not ‘ultimate sovereignty.’”123 The 
Court concluded that aliens held at Guantanamo Bay fell within the scope 
of 28 U.S.C. § 2241 because the United States exercises complete control 
and jurisdiction over that base.124 However, the Court failed to address 
where aliens were to bring petitions for relief. Since the base does not 
technically fall under any federal court’s jurisdiction, the Court fashioned a 
different standard. Unfortunately, the Court-created remedy brings more 
complications than answers.  
The Rasul decision effectively overturned Johnson v. Eisentrager, which 
held that aliens detained outside the United States are not entitled to invoke 
a petition for habeas corpus.125 The dissent in Rasul argued that the 
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majority’s decision was a “wrenching departure from precedent.”126 The 
majority’s decision in Rasul extended, for the first time, the federal court’s 
jurisdiction beyond the territorial jurisdiction of the courts.127 The dissent 
also correctly stated that the extension of the habeas statute over noncitizen 
detainees is properly left to Congress.128 It further argued that if Congress 
had wanted to change federal jurisdiction, it could have easily done so.129 
The departure of the Court into matters properly left to the legislature was 
appropriately recognized by the Rasul dissent as a creation of a “monstrous 
scheme in time of war” and created a “frustration of our military 
commanders’ reliance upon clearly stated prior law.”130  Such a sudden 
departure from precedent was, indeed, “judicial adventurism of the worst 
sort.”131 
1. Hamdan v. Rumsfield 
In Hamdan v. Rumsfield, the Court erred once more by deeming the 
military commissions established by the executive branch as not regularly 
constituted courts adequate to meet due process.132 The dissent in Hamdan 
correctly stressed that the Judiciary does not have the “aptitude, facilities 
nor responsibility” to make military and foreign policy decisions.133 Too 
much judicial interference at home negatively affects the Commander in 
Chief’s and Congress’s ability to conduct foreign affairs abroad.134 The 
Court’s decision in Hamdan to strike down trial by military commissions 
was judicial interference into a political decision, which should have been 
entitled to a “heavy measure of deference.”135  In his dissent, Justice Alito 
argued that military commissions fit squarely within the definition of a 
regularly constituted court.136 Indeed, a military commission is typically 
made up of military officers who try both “fact and law.”137 The military 
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commissions do not use the Federal Rules of Evidence in their 
proceedings.138  Instead, the Presiding Officer determines whether “evidence 
would have probative value to a reasonable person.”139 In order to convict 
the detainee for crimes he has committed, two-thirds of the military panel 
must agree.140 The detainee is also entitled to counsel.141 Thus, there are 
certain procedural safeguards that have been established to ensure that the 
detainee can present a defense.  
2. Deference to the Executive in War-Making Power and to Congress 
in Law-Making Power 
The Boumediene Court’s decision rejected the notion that habeas corpus 
could be withheld from a detainee and further concluded that the tribunals 
were inadequate to satisfy due process.142 Key to its rationale was that the 
detainee has a limited means to rebut the government’s factual assertion 
that he is an enemy combatant.143 Consistent with the Court’s tradition of 
rejecting detainment strategies established by Congress and the Executive, 
despite failing to provide more concrete procedures of its own, the 
Boumediene decision knocked down the “most generous set of procedural 
protections ever afforded aliens detained by this country as enemy 
combatants.”144 Justice Roberts even went so far as to suggest that the 
Court’s decision was not about detainment at all, but rather the Court’s 
attempt to control federal policy over enemy combatants.145 Although the 
majority paid lip service to the “proper deference . . . to the political 
branches,”146 the Court ignored precedent as set out in Eisentrager, declined 
to say how the statute failed to address petitioner’s due process rights, and 
failed to establish a standard that would provide “adequate” procedural 
safeguards that Congress has not already addressed.147 Indeed, “[s]ecurity 
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subsists . . . in fidelity to freedom’s first principles,”148 but other than 
establishing that habeas cannot be suspended for detainees, the Court did 
not establish what rights detainees have. They left that determination for 
the district courts to sift out amongst themselves. 
3. Heightened Security Interest in Military Commissions  
Military commissions play an important role in military operations in 
preventing future terrorist attacks.  Major General Michael J. Nardotti, Jr., a 
retired Judge Advocate General of the Army, emphasized the importance of 
military commissions by stating that they are needed to address “legitimate 
concerns for public and individual safety, the compromise of sensitive 
intelligence, and due regard for the practical necessity to use as evidence 
information obtained in the course of military operation rather than 
through traditional law enforcement means.”149 The sensitive nature of 
these cases require that certain considerations relevant to national security 
allow them to be treated differently, while still providing the accused with 
constitutional protections. Although the tribunals may vary in procedures, 
structure, or composition, they still fall into the category of a “regularly 
constituted court.”150  
C. Federal Court Intervention & the Necessity of Maintaining National 
Security 
The United States’ current military commissions system “is the product 
of an extended dialogue among the President, Congress, and the Supreme 
Court.”151 Although the Supreme Court has not provided concrete 
guidance, the Military Commissions Act of 2009 (“MCA”), as upheld by the 
Al-Nashiri court, provides sufficient procedural protections and review 
mechanisms for military commissions and also provides an adequate 
framework for reviewing challenges to enemy combatants’ status.152 The 
MCA established the Court of Military Commission Review (“CMCR”), 
which reviews decisions of military commissions.153 As part of the revised 
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MCA, Article III courts are given jurisdiction to review the legal 
conclusions of the CMCR, but only after the CMCR has actually made a 
final determination on the merits.154 In Al-Nashiri, the D.C. Circuit upheld 
the process of the CMCR; key to its determination were certain comity 
factors.155 The first factor is advancing the military’s interest in allowing 
these commissions to proceed uninterrupted in order to achieve the 
efficient operation of the military free from regular interference by civilian 
courts.156 The second is the deference duly owed to Congress when it 
created “an integrated system of military courts and review procedures, a 
critical element of which is the Court of Military Appeals consisting of 
civilian judges completely removed from all military influence or 
persuasion.”157 These same comity factors, which were crucial to the holding 
of Al-Nashiri, should also be central when determining the system of review 
of an enemy combatant’s status. 
1. Al-Nashiri   
 In Al-Nashiri, the petitioner, Abd Al-Rahim Hussein Muhammed Al-
Nashiri, was the alleged mastermind of the U.S.S. Cole and the French 
supertanker, the M/V Limburg, bombings, as well as the attempted 
bombing of the U.S.S. The Sullivans.158 Directed by Osama bin Laden, Al-
Nashiri and his co-conspirator, Walid bin Attas, traveled to Yemen, bought 
explosives and a boat, and obtained false identification documents.159 Al-
Nashiri also received explosives training from an al-Qaeda expert when he 
returned to Afghanistan.160 Al-Nashiri directed his suicide bombers to fill 
their boat with explosives and steer it alongside their targets and then 
detonate the explosives.161 Together, the completed attacks killed eighteen 
crew members and injured dozens more.162 Al-Nashiri was arrested by the 
local authorities in Dubai, turned over to U.S. custody, and transferred to 
Guantanamo Bay in 2006.163 A CSRT determined that Al-Nashiri was an 
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enemy combatant and, thus, detainable under the AUMF.164 Al-Nashiri 
filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus challenging various aspects of his 
detention.165 Though his habeas petition is still pending, a military 
commission has convened to try him for terrorism, murder in violation of 
the law of war, and attacking civilians.166 The government is seeking the 
death penalty.167  
Al-Nashiri claims that a military commission does not have jurisdiction 
to try him under the MCA because he did not commit a war crime.168 He 
claims that his actions were “not ‘committed in the context of and 
associated with hostilities.’”169 Al-Nashiri moved for a preliminary 
injunction to prevent his trial by military commission until the district 
court issued a decision on his habeas petition.170 The government filed a 
counter motion to hold the habeas proceedings in abeyance in order for the 
commission to continue its proceedings and the government’s interlocutory 
appeals to be completed.171 The government argued that the same logic 
found in Schlesinger v. Councilman, which prohibited courts from 
interfering with ongoing courts-martial, equally applies here to direct 
federal courts to abstain from interfering with ongoing proceedings in a 
military commission.172 Al-Nashiri unsuccessfully argued that, despite the 
MCA revisions, abstention was inappropriate as decided in Hamdan.173 The 
district court agreed with the government, finding that Al-Nashiri’s habeas 
petition would “unduly interfere” with the proceedings of the military 
commission.174  
2. Incorporating Al-Nashiri into the Detainment Framework 
The court’s underlying rationale and analysis in determining that the 
MCA provided adequate procedural safeguards that satisfy both liberty and 
security provides a solid framework for allowing military detention 
operations to operate without unduly burdensome interference from Article 
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III courts. The court looked to “equally compelling” factors to determine 
whether the revised MCA was sufficient to replace what was purportedly 
lacking in Hamdan.175 First, the court must be assured of the adequacy of 
the alternative system in protecting defendant’s rights.176 The D.C. Circuit 
correctly concluded that the adequacy of the alternative system could be 
“assumed” due to deference to the legislature.177 The Al-Nashiri court 
concluded that the MCA’s review structure was adequate based on its 
similarities to the court-martial review system approved in Schlesinger.178 
Second, the court must be assured of the “importance of the interests served 
by allowing that system to proceed uninterrupted by federal courts.”179 The 
countervailing interest at the top of the list for military review tribunals is 
national security.  In analyzing the second factor, the D.C. Circuit Court in 
Al-Nashiri correctly deferred to the political branches in the arena of 
national security.  
a. Factor one: the adequacy of the alternative system  
The MCA review structure affirmed in Al-Nashiri is not only adequate 
for military commissions, but is also adequate for reviewing status 
determinations. The MCA requires a trial with a military judge and a 
twelve-person jury, consisting of military officers called “members.”180 If the 
defendant is found guilty, the Defense Department official who referred the 
case to trial, known as the convening authority, then reviews the guilty 
finding. The convening authority has the ability to reduce conviction to a 
lesser-included offense of guilt.181 The convening authority may either 
approve the sentence, disapprove, commute, or suspend either the entire 
sentence, or any part thereof.182 If the convening authority confirms or 
modifies the guilty finding, then the conviction goes through another level 
of review under the CMCR, unless the defendant waives such review.183 The 
CMCR provides a level of review that is more insulated from military 
influence because it contains not only military judges, but also civilian 
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judges who have Article III life tenure and salary protection.184 The CMCR 
has the power to review both factual and legal questions.  The district court 
can then review all questions of law and the sufficiency of the evidence 
upon appeal.185 Finally, the ruling of the district court can be challenged by 
filing a petition of writ of certiorari before the Supreme Court.186  
Therefore, the defendant has the protection of four layers of review, and 
the Article III courts cannot interfere until the military has completed its 
trial and review of a guilty finding. Important in the Al-Nashiri court’s 
rationale, and, what the Supreme Court should adopt, was the principle that 
intervention into the “on-the-ground” performance of the system 
(consisting of military commissions designed by Congress and the 
Executive) was not warranted.187 By allowing the defendant to be processed 
through the respective military review tribunals,  the D.C. Circuit implicitly 
acknowledged that the military system is adequate and trustworthy enough 
to perform its assigned task.188 In this regard, the congressional judgment 
must be respected.189 Although the D.C. Circuit has adopted this principle, 
prior decisions of the Supreme Court refused to do so.190  
b. Factor two: the important countervailing interest 
The second factor that directs a federal court to abstain from interfering 
in a military commission proceedings is the “important countervailing 
interest.”191 The Supreme Court should adopt an approach that allows the 
military system established by the Congress and the President to be 
completed before any Article III courts can interfere in either status 
determinations or trials for war crimes.192 The framers of the MCA 
implicitly intended that there should be no interference from the federal 
courts until military commissions complete their work.193 Key to a better 
detainment strategy is the principle that courts must give due deference to 
the other branches on matters of national security. As in Al-Nashiri, the 
court recognized that judgments from military commission arose “out of 
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concern for national security needs,” which deserve “wide deference.”194 
Thus, the Al-Nashiri court concluded that the important countervailing 
interest was “the need for federal courts to avoid exercising their equitable 
powers in a manner that would unduly impinge on the prerogatives of the 
political branches in the sensitive realm of national security.”195 Comity 
guides this decision, resulting in restraint of the courts from interfering 
with such a “sensitive realm.”196 
The key provision of the MCA is that it provides for Article III review, 
but only at a specific point, and no sooner.197 First, there must be a status 
determination initially made by a CSRT, then approved by a Department of 
Defense official.198 Furthermore, there is a trial and a conviction in the 
military system, approved by the convening authority, and then an appeal 
to the CMCR.199 After this layer of review, there should be an additional 
layer of review by a military review commission consisting of a civilian 
judge and military judge before a challenge to detainment based on status 
can be heard by an Article III court. Such a scheme not only provides the 
military more control over matters of national security, but also allows the 
end result to be reviewed in Article III courts only after passing through the 
layers of the military system.200 By giving deference to the words of the 
legislature, it is obvious that “[l]itigants may not . . . prevent the proper 
operation of the congressional scheme by pursuing equitable relief in 
district court.”201 Instruction by the “political branches” on the structure of 
the military review system is enough to “qualif[y] as an ‘important 
countervailing interest’ warranting abstention . . . where that instruction is 
based on those branches’ assessment of national security needs.”202 As the 
D.C. Circuit states in Al-Nashiri, the expertise of the political branches in 
the realm of national security is at its “apogee.”203 
Alleviating the Need for Judicial Intervention 
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The Al-Nahsiri court recognized key advantages to maintaining the 
system established by the political branches.204 First, the need for immediate 
intervention significantly decreases because an Article III court has the 
opportunity to eventually remedy any errors on appeal after review by a 
military review commission consisting of a civilian judge and military 
judge.205 Also, following the guidance in Schlesinger, abstention in such 
matters emphasizes and respects military expertise.206 Additionally, the 
advantage of abstaining in pretrial intervention is that it “eliminates 
‘duplicative proceedings,’ potentially ‘obviat[ing] the need for judicial 
intervention,’ [while] ‘inform[ing] and narrow[ing]’ eventual Article III 
review.”207 
V.  DETERMINING DURATION OF DETENTION 
 After a detainee’s status is determined and the procedural process 
attaches, the next step is to determine how long detention is warranted.  
This part of the detainment strategy also warrants less judicial interference 
and more deference to the military. The Hamdi Court noted that indefinite 
imprisonment, even on reasonable suspicion, was simply not an available 
option of treatment for those accused of aiding the enemy.208 However, 
defining what parameters constitute “definite” detention has proven 
problematic. Unlike past wars, the War on Terrorism has not provided the 
luxury of a defined limit in duration.209  This phenomenon poses a problem 
to the detention of combatants involved in the War on Terror.  
A. Two Schools of Thought 
The majority holds to the principle that detention may last no longer 
than active hostilities.210 The main question then becomes whether the 
existence of hostilities is determined by a totality of the circumstances 
analysis or by some declaration by one of the political branches. The 
plurality view expressed in Hamdan states that a political, public act is 
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needed to establish hostilities.211 The dissent’s view in Hamdan was that a 
contemporaneous public act is not required, but that the determination 
depends on a retrospective analysis.212  
The U.S. government argues that the correct standard should be that 
hostilities are determined by a retrospective and prospective analysis of the 
factual situation on the ground.213 If it is determined that active hostilities 
exist, or remain, then detainment is justified so long as it is necessary to 
prevent enemy combatants from returning to the battlefield.214 Even a 
complete withdrawal of all combat troops from a country does not end 
hostilities, because there are other factual scenarios to be considered. The 
first is whether Al Qaeda, the Taliban, or other hostile enemy forces have 
the capacity to engage in hostilities based on their “embedment in local or 
regional insurgencies.”215 Another factor to be considered is the hostile 
group’s aggregate of affiliated groups who help plan and conduct attacks.216 
This includes the recognition of a transnational conflict, not bound to any 
geographic territory.217 The nature of the transnational conflict makes it 
difficult for some to accept that the mere capability of a wide-reaching 
network to engage in hostilities can justify detainment.218  
Some argue, instead, that the standard is not based on whether hostilities 
cease to exist with terrorist organizations, but whether they have ceased 
with the detained individual “because he no longer poses a substantial 
danger of rejoining hostilities.”219 However, determining whether an enemy 
combatant poses a threat to rejoining can be precarious.  A Summary 
Report of Detainees Formerly Held at Guantanamo Bay confirmed that, as 
of January 15, 2016, 30.2% of 676 detainees released from Guantanamo Bay 
have rejoined militant activity or are suspected of rejoining militant 
activity.220  
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 Justice Holmes once said, “Public danger warrants the substitution of 
executive process for judicial process.”221 Because the executive branch 
possesses the power of Commander in Chief, decisions pertaining to 
matters of national security should fall squarely on his shoulders and not on 
those of the Judiciary. The standard should be that detainment is necessary 
so long as the detainee poses a threat of re-engaging in militant activity 
against the United States. In Hamdi, Justice Thomas put greater weight in 
the security interest than the liberty interest by recognizing that “the 
Government’s regulatory interest in community safety can, in appropriate 
circumstances, outweigh an individual’s liberty interest. For example, in 
times of war or insurrection, when society’s interest is at its peak, the 
Government may detain individuals whom the Government believes to be 
dangerous.”222  
B. Deference to the Executive  
Whether or not the “end of hostilities” has arrived in the fight against the 
Taliban, there is still the potential that these detainees will return to the 
battlefield and the service of another emerging terrorist group. While the 
modern expansion of the theatre of war raises the stakes primarily in 
protecting America’s security interests, it also affects liberty interests. 
However,  
[T]he Executive’s decision that a detention is necessary to protect 
the public need not and should not be subjected to judicial 
second-guessing. Indeed, at least in the context of enemy-
combatant determinations, this would defeat the unity, secrecy, 
and dispatch that the Founders believed to be so important to the 
war-making function.223  
Detaining enemy combatants and preventing them from returning to the 
theatre of war heightens the need to ensure that the basis of their detention 
is justified, and that their detention is not constantly subject to judicial 
second-guessing.  With the processes outlined above, the adequate 
protections afforded to detainees’ liberty interests during the detainee’s 
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classification stage allow for a stronger argument to be made for indefinite 
detention based on the continued dangerousness of the detainee or his 
likelihood of re-engaging in hostilities against the United States. Thus, the 
court should leave the determination of whether a detainee will return to 
the battlefield to the political branches because the political braches have far 
more experience and better authority to do so. 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
Balancing security and liberty is difficult, but it is essential to a 
sustainable detainment strategy. The Court, in Hamdan, Boumediene, and 
Hamdi failed to provide any guidance on the specific rights that detainees 
enjoy, and made no determination on what the political branches could do 
to avoid judicial interference. As recognized in Al-Nashiri, judicial review 
must be used as a last resort in military detainment systems. More deference 
must be given to the political branches to craft a system that highlights our 
military expertise on the ground and does not detract from the maintenance 
of national security.  
This requires redefining our traditional definitions to better assess our 
modern enemies’ methods of combat. Clearly defining the standards in 
conjunction with a detainment strategy, both in classifying and trying 
detainees, will prevent undue interference from federal courts and allow the 
political branches and the military to operate in a manner that will best 
protect the nation’s security.   
The very nature of war grants the Executive a measure of deference, but a 
common concern is that this deference lays the foundation for political 
abuse of our liberty.224  However, national security and liberty can both be 
maintained, without sacrificing either, by maintaining a detainment 
strategy at the lowest level possible, away from judicial second-guessing and 
within routine military operations in the theatre of war. Those on the 
ground, not in chambers, are in the best possible position to determine a 
detainee’s status and the likelihood that he will reengage in militant activity. 
Therefore, it is within the Commander in Chief’s, and the military’s power 
to make these decisions, not the Judiciary’s.  
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